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Abstract
We investigated whether the presence of imagery at retrieval was associated with the finding that negative pictures and scenes are
recalled with greater perceptual detail. Participants were presented with 30 scenes taken from the International Affective Picture
System that were rated either high or low on valence, but similarly on arousal. Recall was promptedwith matched visual or verbal
cues. During recall, participants reported any images that came to mind and rated them for vividness, whereas accuracy was rated
independently. Imagery was described at test in response to over 60% of the stimuli. Whereas vividness was predicted by
negative valence, images occurred more often in response to visual cues. The association of negative valence and visual cueing
with better recall was observed only in the presence of reported imagery. These findings have important implications for models
and experiments focusing on the recall and recognition of visual stimuli.
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A finding with important practical and theoretical implications is
that negatively, as compared to positively, valenced pictures and
scenes are associatedwith superior recognition and senseof recol-
lection (Ochsner, 2000), particularly with respect to their central
visual details (Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Kensinger, 2009;
Kensinger,Garoff-Eaton,&Schacter,2006).Somereasonsfor this
may be that negatively valenced scenes recruit more sensory pro-
cessing areas at encoding (Kensinger & Schacter, 2008; Mickley
&Kensinger, 2008) and that there is a greater recapitulationof this
processing at retrieval (Bowen &Kensinger, 2017). Much less is
knownabout thephenomenologicalprocessesoperatingat retriev-
al that correspond to or could mediate neural differences in the
processing of positive and negative scenes. A number of lines of
evidence pointing to the importance of imagery (Brewer & Pani,
1983;Brewin,2014)suggest that thesuperior recallofvisualdetail
accompanying negative stimuli could be a consequence of partic-
ipants retrieving sensory images. In the present study, we report
phenomenological data on imagery retrieval in the recall of visual
scenes and investigate the extent to which such retrieval can ex-
plain the impacts of valence anddifferent typesof cueon the recall
of positive and negative pictures.
Our capacity for long-term recall of visually detailed real-life
scenes is very large (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2008).
The limit on the number of scenes greatly exceeds working
memory constraints, although the quantity of information in
each scene may be similar to that held in working memory
(Brady, Konkle, Gill, Oliva, & Alvarez, 2013). More direct
evidence that these representations play a functional role is pro-
vided by the observation that repeated recall of pictures pro-
duces hypermnesia, consistent with the presence of a persistent
visual image that permits multiple opportunities for inspection
and selection from the available information. Moreover, spon-
taneous visual memories of past autobiographical events are an
everyday phenomenon (Brewin, Christodoulides, &
Hutchinson, 1996) that can be produced in response to a wide
variety of tasks, including generating word associations and
passively viewing words and phrases (Berntsen, Staugaard, &
Sørensen, 2013; Brewin & Soni, 2011; Mace, 2009; Schlagman
& Kvavilashvili, 2008; Uzer, Lee, & Brown, 2012). Finally,
individuals who report greater levels of visual imagery in gen-
eral also show superior recall of pictures (Marks, 1973).
Less attention has been paid to how often images specific
to the materials used are retrieved during the course of
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experimental tests of memory, but the fact that concrete words
are recalled better than abstract words has strongly suggested a
role for imagery in verbal learning (Paivio, 1969). The study
of visual memory has established that the recall of previously
encoded scenes is commonly accompanied by eyemovements
that are similar to those that occurred at encoding, and
restricting these eye movements produces impairment in
memory (Brandt & Stark, 1997; Johansson, Holsanova,
Dewhurst, & Holmqvist, 2012). Diary studies have also
shown that over several days, postexperiment memories of
negative stimuli may return in the form of involuntary images,
whether the stimuli are pictures (Bryant, McGrath, &
Felmingham, 2013) or films (Brewin & Saunders, 2001;
Ferree & Cahill, 2009; James et al., 2016). These studies are
frequently used to test theories of posttraumatic stress disor-
der, a condition characterized by repetitive involuntary images
of distressing scenes. The negative emotions associated with
trauma are believed to be responsible for the persistence of
these images (Brewin, 2014).
Although the participants in diary studies can often report
the cues that triggered sudden recall of their autobiographical
memories, there is controversy over which cues are most con-
ducive to doing so (Mace, 2005). Where some studies
(Berntsen & Hall, 2004) have shown that sensory cues are
more likely to evoke them, others (Mace, 2004) have revealed
that the majority of cues are language- or thought-based. In
posttraumatic stress disorder, a condition characterized by the
frequent retrieval of visual traumatic memories, it has been
argued that sensory cues are likely to be more important than
verbal cues (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010;
Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004).
Sensory cues also appear to have an advantage because, in
numerous types of experiments, greater recall accuracy is as-
sociated with the presence of more perceptual details in the
memories (Brewin, Huntley, & Whalley, 2012; Johnson,
Suengas, Foley, & Raye, 1988; Schooler, Gerhard, & Loftus,
1986).
In the present study, we aimed to investigate the ability
of visual and verbal cues to lead to the retrieval of images
of the previously presented stimuli as part of the recall
process, as well as to determine the extent to which mem-
ory accuracy was predicted separately by stimulus va-
lence, cue type, and the occurrence of such imagery. To
clarify whether such imagery was similar to the
postexperimental images that have previously been report-
ed, after completing the task, participants were required to
complete involuntary memory diaries over the subsequent
seven days. It was predicted that negative as compared to
positive pictures and visual as compared to verbal cues
would elicit imagery that both corresponded more fre-
quently to the picture presented and was more vivid.
Second, we predicted that negative as compared to posi-
tive pictures and visual as compared to verbal cues would
be associated with more accurate recall, and that these
effects would be moderated by the presence of imagery.
Finally, in accordance with research that has employed
films differing in valence (Arnaudova & Hagenaars,
2017), as well as with theories of posttraumatic stress
disorder, we predicted that both negative images and im-
ages that had been prompted by a visual cue would come
spontaneously to mind more often over the following
week.
Method
Participants
The participants were 40 undergraduate students (30 female,
10 male) from 18 to 23 years of age (mean = 19.60, SD =
1.41). They were volunteers or received course credits in order
to take part.
Materials and measures
Visual scenes Thirty scenes1 from the International Affective
Pictures System (IAPS) (Lang, Öhman, & Vaitl, 1988) were
chosen on the basis of their affective valence rating, which
ranged from 1 (very unpleasant) to 9 (very pleasant). The
positive scenes (mean = 7.20) and negative scenes (mean =
2.30) did not differ in arousal (means = 5.11 and 5.69, respec-
tively), t(28) = 2.03, p > .05. Two additional IAPS pictures
were used to illustrate the procedure to participants before the
study began.
Retrieval cues For each scene, two matched cues were created,
one visual and one verbal, representing the same neutral object
or background feature (see Fig. 1 for an example; a complete
list of the scenes and cues is given in Supplementary Table 1).
Participants saw one cue corresponding to each scene, de-
pending on their group assignment (see the Design and
Procedure section). Each cue was unique to its corresponding
scene. Photoshop CS5 was used to create the visual cues,
which involved removing parts of the background or fore-
ground or cutting out parts of the scene to be presented in
isolation on a black background. The verbal cues were pre-
sented in Times New Roman 72-point font in white on a black
background. All cues were presented at the center of the
screen.
A separate sample of ten participants rated the cues for
valence on the IAPS 1–9 scale, in the absence of their
surrounding context; they rated both the verbal (mean =
5.10) and visual (mean = 5.15) cues as being neutral. To
1 Participants were originally shown 40 images, but tenwere removed to make
the images comparable on levels of arousal.
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check that the visual cues were rated as equally neutral
within positive and negative picture contexts, a further
sample of ten participants rated the cues in different con-
texts and on the same valence scale, reporting averages of
4.77 for cues appearing in positive pictures and 4.97 for
cues appearing in negative pictures. Finally, to check that
the visual cues were not more strongly related to the con-
tent of the positive than of the negative pictures (or vice
versa), this same sample rated the cues for thematic relat-
edness on a similar scale, ranging from 1 (not at all the-
matically related) to 9 (extremely thematically related).
These ratings averaged to 3.41 for cues appearing in pos-
itive pictures and 2.97 for cues appearing in negative
pictures.
Distraction task Classical music was played for 30 s, and
participants were required to report when a new instrument
was introduced and the name of that instrument. This task was
designed to prevent rehearsal of the final scenes. The music
was a section from The Planets by Gustav Holst, BJupiter, the
Bringer of Jollity.^
Rating of vividness of imagery Participants rated the vivid-
ness of any visual imagery using a scale adapted from
the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire: 1 = no
image came to mind, 2 = a dim and vague image came
to mind, 3 = a reasonably clear image came to mind, 4
= an image as clear as day came to mind (Marks,
1973).
Rating of accuracy Two researchers rated the accuracy of par-
ticipants’ picture recall using the following scale: 1 = no de-
tails were correct, 2 = a few details such as the scene valence
or colors were correct, 3 = most details were correct but
errors were present, 4 = all the details were correct. One
researcher rated accuracy during the experiment, and the sec-
ond researcher rated it after the participants’ responses had
been transcribed. The ratings were highly consistent (weight-
ed kappa = .95).
Memory diary For the following seven days, participants kept
a paper-and pencil diary in which they recorded any sponta-
neously occurring memories or images of the stimuli seen in
the experiment. They were instructed to complete the diary at
the same time each day, recording any intrusion experienced
that day. To distinguish such images from deliberate attempts
to recall the stimuli, participants were giving the definition of
an involuntary memory or image as one that Bcomes to mind
spontaneously without any conscious attempt to bring it to
mind.^As well as recording what the image consisted of, they
used the vividness scale employed during the experiment to
rate each intrusion. The methodology was similar to that used
in the vast majority of previous trauma-film studies (James
et al., 2016).
Design and procedure
The mixed-model design involved two within-subjects vari-
ables: the valence of the scene (positive or negative) and the
type of cue (visual or verbal). All participants viewed the same
mixture of positive and negative scenes, with half the scenes
of each valence (i.e., seven or eight) having a visual, and the
remainder a verbal, retrieval cue. We used one between-
subjects variable (participants were randomly assigned to
one of two conditions so that the assignment of cue types to
scenes was counterbalanced). The dependent variables were
accuracy in the cued recall task as well as the number and
vividness of images that occurred, both at recall and during
the following week.
For this intentional memory task, participants were in-
formed that they would be required to view and later to
recall pictures that could depict some very negative and
distressing scenes. Two demonstration pictures, one posi-
tive and one negative, were shown to participants in order
to allow them to decide whether they wanted to take part
in the study. None withdrew at this stage. Each of the 30
scenes was presented in randomized order on a computer
screen for 10 s, both preceded and followed with a black
screen for 0.5 s. Following the distraction task, partici-
pants were told that they would be shown reminders of
the previously seen pictures and that these would be either
descriptions or parts of the previous pictures. The re-
minders were chosen to be neutral background objects
or features, for two reasons: first to ensure that partici-
pants had fully encoded the scenes as instructed, and not
simply focused on the most salient aspects, and second, to
ensure that the comparison of visual versus verbal cues
could not be influenced by the valence of the retrieval
Fig. 1 A positive scene, with its corresponding visual and verbal cues
Mem Cogn
cue. Participants viewed the randomly ordered visual and
verbal cues for 10 s, described as many details of the
corresponding picture as they could, and then reported
whether an image had been prompted by the cue and
how vivid it was.
The diary was then described, and participants were told to
start completing it on the same day on which the experiment
began. Participants provided cell phone numbers so they
could be reminded each day at 7 p.m. by text message to
complete the diary. The diary was returned after seven days.
Results
Number and vividness of retrieved images
All participants reported at least some images coming to mind
following the cue presentations. The average number per person
was 16.18 images that correctly corresponded to the original
picture (i.e., for just over half the cues) and 2.68 incorrect im-
ages.2 Table 1 presents the average vividness and number of
images elicited by the visual and verbal cues corresponding to
positive and negative pictures. A 2 (Valence: positive vs. nega-
tive) × 2 (Cue Type: visual vs. verbal) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on vividness ratings indicated a significant effect of
valence, F(1, 35) = 7.95, p = .008, ηp
2 = .18, whereby negative
imagesweremore vivid than positive images. Therewas nomain
effect of cue type, F(1, 35) = .11, p = .74, and no interaction
between valence and cue type, F(1, 35) = 2.72, p = .11.
A similar ANOVA on the numbers of images that correctly
corresponded to the original pictures (i.e., that received an
accuracy rating greater than 1) revealed a main effect of cue,
F(1, 39) = 47.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = .55, indicating that visual
cues elicited more images than did verbal cues. We found no
main effect of valence, F(1, 39) = 2.39, p = .13, and no cue
type by valence interaction, F(1, 39) = 1.54, p = .22. The
corresponding ANOVA on the numbers of incorrect images
indicated main effects of cue, F(1, 39) = 4.61, p < .038, ηp
2 =
.11, and of valence, F(1, 39) = 12.06, p < .001, ηp
2 = .24, as
well as a two-way interaction, F(1, 39) = 6.46, p = .015, ηp
2 =
.14. As is shown in Table 1, incorrect images were more in-
frequent after negative pictures elicited by visual cues than
after any other valence–cue type combination.
Accuracy of cued recall
No significant differences were found for the average accura-
cy of cued recall in the two counterbalanced conditions, t(59)
= 1.72, p = .78, and these were collapsed for the analyses. The
accuracy data are shown in Table 2. A 2 (Valence: positive vs.
negative) × 2 (Cue Type: visual vs. verbal) × 2 (image vs. no
image) ANOVA revealed main effects of valence, F(1, 31) =
7.98, p = .008, ηp
2 = .20; cue type, F(1, 31) = 8.84, p = .006,
ηp
2 = .22; and presence of an image, F(1, 31) = 901.54, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .97, indicating that accuracy was greater for neg-
ative scenes, visual cues, and when images were retrieved.
The analysis also revealed several significant interactions,
including one between valence and cue, F(1, 31) = 4.89, p =
.035, ηp
2 = .14. Pairwise comparisons indicated that in the
presence of visual cues, negative scenes were recalled more
accurately than were positive scenes, t(31) = 3.91, p < .001. In
the presence of verbal cues, there were no differences in recall
accuracy, t(31) = 0.20, p > .80. Another interaction was found
between valence and retrieval of an image, F(1, 31) = 6.35, p
= .017, ηp
2 = .17. Pairwise comparisons indicated that in the
presence of an image, the advantage for recall of negative over
positive scenes was significant, t(31) = 2.09, p < .05, but in the
absence of an image there was no effect of valence, t(31) =
0.95, p > .30.
The final significant interaction was that between cue type
and retrieval of an image, F(1, 31) = 8.02, p = .008, ηp
2 = .20.
Pairwise comparisons indicated that in the presence of an im-
age, the recall advantage conferred by visual cues was signif-
icant, t(31) = 3.06, p < .01, but in the absence of an image
there was no effect of cue type, t(31) = 0.11, p > .90. The
three-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 31) = 1.71, p
= .201.
Diary study of involuntary memories
Twenty-nine participants returned diaries, and all recorded at
least one involuntary visual memory of the test material dur-
ing the seven-day follow-up period, with a mean of 6.79 (SD =
3.96) memories reported (including repeated memories of the
same scenes). The number of involuntary memories ranged
from 1 to 15 (one participant reporting 23 memories was ex-
cluded as an outlier). Out of 193 memories, 164 (85%) had
previously come to mind during the recall phase of the exper-
imental session. Table 3 presents the average numbers of in-
voluntary memories for positive and negative scenes that had
been prompted at initial recall by visual and verbal cues.
A 2 (Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (Cue Type: visual
vs. verbal) ANOVA revealed main effects of valence, F(1, 27)
= 24.83, p < .001, ηp
2 = .48, and cue type, F(1, 27) = 10.39, p
= .003, ηp
2 = .28, qualified by a two-way interaction, F(1, 27)
= 12.49, p < .001, ηp
2 = .32. Analysis of the interaction re-
vealed that of the pictures initially retrieved after visual cues,
negative scenes were more likely than positive scenes to be
involuntarily recalled, t(27) = 4.83, p < .001. Among the neg-
ative pictures, those initially retrieved after visual cues were
more likely to be involuntarily recalled than were those
2 Incorrect images might theoretically have involved either scenes that were
among either the 30 that were analyzed or the ten that were not analyzed. The
average number of incorrect responses was very small, however, and
distinguishing between error types is unlikely to affect our conclusions.
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retrieved after verbal cues, t(27) = 3.61, p = .001. There were
no significant differences between the numbers of positive
scenes that were involuntarily recalled after initial exposure
to visual and verbal cues, t(27) = 0.00, p = 1.00, or between
the numbers of positive and negative scenes that were invol-
untarily recalled after initial exposure to verbal cues, t(27) =
1.79, p = .084.
Discussion
Our first prediction was that negative as compared to positive
pictures and visual as compared with verbal cues would elicit
imagery that both corresponded more frequently to the picture
presented and was more vivid. This prediction was only par-
tially supported: Relative to positive scenes, negative scenes
did not elicit a greater number of correct images, but their
images were more vivid. In contrast, visual cues elicited more
correct images, but there was no increase in vividness. The
combination of a negative scene and a visual cue resulted in
fewer incorrect images being elicited.
The phenomenological experience of imagery accompany-
ing retrieval was present in all participants and occurred on
average to over half of the available cues. This task-related
imagery is distinct from the associated autobiographical mem-
ories that have been prompted by previous experimental pro-
cedures, such as generating word associations and passively
viewing words and phrases (Brewin & Soni, 2011; Mace,
2005; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).
Our second prediction was that negative as compared to
positive pictures and visual as compared with verbal cues
would be associated with more accurate recall, and that these
effects would be moderated by the presence of imagery. Our
data replicated previous studies that had found negative stim-
uli to be recalled more accurately than positive stimuli
(Kensinger, 2009; Ochsner, 2000). Furthermore, we showed
that the recall advantage for negative scenes was limited to
instances in which an image was retrieved or a visual cue had
been used (i.e., a cue associated with an increased probability
of imagery retrieval). In the absence of these elements, we
observed no advantage in accuracy, just as there was no ad-
vantage in accuracy for a visual cue unless it was followed by
the retrieval of an image.
Although it is theoretically possible for the scenes also
to have been represented in a verbal form, in practice the
absence of an image resulted in a very limited account of
its content being given, with recall scores being very close
to their floor. The actual size of the advantage conferred
by an image was hard to estimate in this study, because of
the use of accuracy ratings rather than a count of numbers
of specific details. It seemed from the mean ratings, how-
ever, that retrieved images improved recall, but by no
means captured all the details available in the original
scene.
The large effect size for recall accuracy associated with
retrieval of an image echoes other findings concerning long-
term memory. For example, memory for the colors of 232
objects seen one after the other for 1 s apiece was compared
with memory for the colors of three objects held in working
memory for 3 s (Brady et al., 2013). Although the color of
around half of the 232 objects was forgotten, the fidelity with
which color was recalled for remembered items was equiva-
lent to that for the three items in working memory. In another
study, patients with posttraumatic stress disorder were better
able to discriminate words and phrases from their own trauma
narrative, as compared to another trauma narrative, when
those words or phrases elicited an involuntary visual image
(Brewin et al., 2012). As in that study, we usually found the
images that came tomind to be appropriate to the retrieval cue,
but on some occasions to be incorrect.
One caveat involves the difficulty of matching the strengths
of verbal and visual cues in an experiment, as well as of
Table 1 Mean number and
vividness of images (with
standard deviations) retrieved
during cued recall
Valence Cue Mean vividness Number of correct images Number of incorrect images
Positive Visual 3.18 (0.47) 4.22 (1.51) 0.85 (0.92)
Verbal 3.04 (0.60) 3.30 (1.74) 0.85 (0.89)
Negative Visual 3.31 (0.43) 4.82 (1.58) 0.20 (0.40)
Verbal 3.40 (0.65) 3.22 (1.67) 0.77 (0.77)
Table 2 Mean accuracy (with
standard deviation) of recall, by
valence, cue type, and image
Valence Cue Mean accuracy
with image
Mean accuracy
without image
Positive Visual 2.90 (0.49) 1.02 (0.08)
Verbal 2.74 (0.77) 1.03 (0.13)
Negative Visual 3.36 (0.41) 1.08 (0.22)
Verbal 2.90 (0.68) 1.03 (0.95)
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determining the strength of a visual cue for a real-world event.
Rather than conclude that visual cues are generally more ef-
fective than verbal cues in picture recall, therefore, our data
should be seen as throwing light on one effective mechanism
(image retrieval) that is likely to increase the chance of suc-
cessful recall.
We agree with Brewer and Pani (1983) that these aspects of
memory are potentially of great importance, even though it is
very difficult to establish unequivocally that they have a caus-
al impact. For example, it is difficult to determine the extent to
which aspects of the encoding contributed both to enhanced
recall and to the probability of an image being retrieved.
However, the fact that these images continued to intrude over
the following week, in some cases, consistent with findings
from numerous previous studies (Brewin, 2014; Ferree &
Cahill, 2009; James et al., 2016), affirms that participants
who reported an image were unlikely to have been simply
describing the recall process in another way. Rather, they were
describing a phenomenological experience that has been ob-
served outside, as well as within, the confines of the experi-
mental session. In future studies it would be desirable to col-
lect more detailed information on the content of these im-
ages—for example, to verify what material from the wider
scene the images included beyond the cue prompts.
Our third prediction was that these later involuntarymemories
would be more likely to occur when the original scene was
negative and had been elicited by a visual cue, and this was
confirmed by the data. This more persistent imagery is likely to
offer a recall advantage to negative stimuli over the longer term,
although this was not explicitly tested in our study. In previous
research, negative films have routinely elicitedmore spontaneous
memories than have positive films (Arnaudova & Hagenaars,
2017). The data are also consistent with claims made by psycho-
logical theories of posttraumatic stress disorder that intrusive
trauma memories are elicited more readily by sensory reminders
of the traumatic event (Brewin et al., 2010; Ehlers & Clark,
2000), as well as with evidence that the degree to which stimuli
evoke perceptual priming predicts the development of involun-
tary images (Michael & Ehlers, 2007; Sündermann, Hauschildt,
& Ehlers, 2013).
Turning to the nonpredicted findings, it was intriguing that
whereas subjective vividness was associated with negative ver-
sus positive stimulus valence and not with cue type, the
probability of an image being retrieved was associated with cue
type and not with valence. The data suggest that these two as-
pects of memory have different underlying mechanisms. In a
study from our laboratory using a traumatic film as a stimulus,
we similarly found that the vividness and frequency of involun-
tary memories of the film were uncorrelated. Moreover, frequen-
cy and amount of perceptual detail, but not vividness, were as-
sociated with reductions in heart rate during specific film scenes
(Chou, La Marca, Steptoe, & Brewin, 2014).
The results are also reminiscent of other reports that both
the subjective vividness of the recall experience and the accu-
racy of recall have a degree of functional independence,
whether the stimuli are pictures (Sharot, Delgado, & Phelps,
2004) or words (Dougal & Rotello, 2007). There is evidence
that the subjective vividness of visual imagery is dependent on
the availability of working memory resources, specifically the
visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). These
resources may not be implicated in the relative probability of
an image being retrieved to a visual or verbal cue.
Our study is limited by the absence of neutral pictures and by
the weak (although nonsignificant) positive association between
valence and arousal. Furthermore, it should be noted that there
may have been overall differences in the numbers of details that
could be remembered for positive and negative scenes, potential-
ly having an effect on the rating of participants’ recall.
Nevertheless, the findings suggest that the established recall ad-
vantage for negative over positive scenes has to do with the fact
that they are accompanied in the short term by more vivid imag-
ery, and in the longer term by more persistent imagery. Our data
support previous arguments that memory theories addressing
effects such as that of valence on recall need to take into account
the specific types of stimuli used (Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez,
2011), and pay greater attention to phenomenology (Brewer &
Pani, 1983). Thus, models of recognition and recall may benefit
from taking into account whether the stimuli are words, pictures,
autobiographical memories, and so forth, and addressing the role
of imagery retrieval.
The results may be particularly important for functional
neuroimaging studies that address the processes engaged at
retrieval and their relation to recall success. For example, such
studies typically show that the brain regions involved in
encoding sensory–perceptual detail tend to be reactivated at
retrieval (Danker & Anderson, 2010) and tend to be more
active during accurate than during inaccurate retrieval
(Schacter & Loftus, 2013). Our finding that successful recall
is often linked to the subjective experience of imagery raises
the possibility that these patterns of neural activation are
accounted for by retrieval of a conscious image, rather than
being a more general index of memory accuracy. Assessing
the content of retrieved images and discounting those that are
examples of incorrect retrieval could lead to more precise
ways of characterizing the neural processes underlying
accuracy.
Table 3 Means (with standard deviations) of the number of involuntary
memories reported in the daily diary
Valence Cue Number of involuntary memories
Positive Visual 0.82 (1.22)
Verbal 0.82 (0.98)
Negative Visual 3.75 (3.07)
Verbal 1.39 (1.52)
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